Learning in Budgeted Auctions with Spacing Objectives

Giannis Fikioris
Robert Kleinberg
Yoav Kolumbus
raunak kumar
Eva Tardos
EC (2025)

Abstract

In many repeated auction settings, participants care not only about how frequently they win but also about how their winnings are distributed over time.
This problem arises in various practical domains where avoiding congested demand is crucial and spacing is important, such as advertising campaigns.
We initiate the study of repeated auctions with preferences for spacing of wins over time.
We introduce a simple model of this phenomenon, where the value of a win is given by any concave function of the time since the last win.

We study the optimal policies for this setting in repeated second-price auctions and offer learning algorithms for the bidders that achieve $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret.
We achieve this by showing that an infinite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) with the budget constraint in expectation is essentially equivalent to our problem, \emph{even when limiting that MDP to a very small number of states}.
The algorithm achieves low regret by learning a bidding policy that chooses bids as a function of the context and the state of the system, which will be the time elapsed since the last win (or conversion).
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